Abstract

This study addresses the question of why some decision-makers and political elites in Chosŏn and the Republic of Korea (ROK) remained committed to the Ming Dynasty and the Republic of China (ROC) when the latter had declined in power. Based on the social psychological literature on righteousness, we explore this relationship through the lens of spontaneous and binding mechanisms. The former refers to voluntary help after reciprocity has been internalized as a duty, and the latter suggests that although individuals are reluctant to help, the fear of violating righteousness motivates continued commitment. Using the most-different case design, this study finds supporting evidence from both the Chosŏn and the ROK periods. Specifically, Chosŏn loyalist officials insisted on aiding the weakened Ming and dethroned the rationalist King, Gwanghaegun. Moreover, those Korean elites who lived through the Korean Independence Movement and the Korean War emphasized diplomatic ties with the ROC even after the ROC lost its UN seat in 1971. By integrating social psychology and constructivism literature, the findings illuminate how the norms of righteousness shape decision-makers' foreign policy and alliance commitment preferences.